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“He was ill. ... Darkness surrounded him;  
it had penetrated his soul; and in that darkness,  
he sat and wept.” 
André BELYI, St Petersburg, 1912 
 
One of the most unique of the Russian religious philosophers 
who populated first the salons of St. Petersburg and then the émigré 
gatherings in Berlin and Paris, Lev Shestov (1866-1938) is also one of the 
most difficult to force into a strict philosophical system. His friend 
Berdiaev wrote that Shestov “sought God, he sought the liberation of man 
from the forces of necessity. î...º The human tragedy, the terrors and 
suffering of human life, the surviving of hopelessness, were all at the 
basis of philosophy.” Pattison says that “Shestov’s entire career is, in 
effect, a sustained attack on reason and ethics,” and Shein that “this all-
embracing idea was a passionate desire to liberate man from the 
tyrannical power of necessity in order to find the truth that is beyond the 
limits of necessity.” Celebrating the irrational and the Absurd in his 
passionate attacks on Reason, Shestov is most famous for his religious 
existentialism, where he argued that humanity can live authentically only 
through radical faith in the Biblical God. Reflecting on the religious 
themes in Shestov’s thought, Zenkovskii noted that “Shestov is 
essentially a religious thinker; he is not anthropocentric but theocentric.”1  
                                                           
I would like to thank Zdenko Zlatar and Garry Trompf for their comments on 
earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 Nicholas BERDIAEV, “The Fundamental Ideas of the Philosophy of Lev 
Shestov,” in Lev Shestov, Speculation and Revelation, trans. Bernard Martin, p. 1 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 1982); George PATTISON, Anxious Angels: A 
Retrospective View of Religious Existentialism, p. 188 (Hampshire: Macmillan 
Press, 1999); Louis J. SHEIN, “Lev Shestov: A Russian Existentialist,” The 
Russian Review 26 (1967), no. 3, p. 278; V. V. ZENKOVSKY, A History of Russian 
Philosophy, trans. George L. Kline, vol. II, p. 781 (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1953). 
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Zenkovskii’s comment is helpful because it acknowledges that, 
for Shestov, everything flows from one’s understanding of God. But it is 
also misleading. A close examination of Shestov’s early career reveals 
that far from consistently being a religious philosopher, as he is usually 
portrayed, between 1897 and 1911 Shestov believed God to be dead, a 
belief that significantly impacted his anthropology, giving it a Stirnerian 
flavour, and which caused him to reject both the atheistic Russian 
Intelligentsia and the Russian religious philosophers, none of whom really 
appreciated the full implications of deicide. Influenced heavily by 
Nietzsche’s ideas about suffering and the death of God, during this 
period, Shestov’s mental world was close to that of European Modernism 
as both Shestov and the Modernists were attempting to revision a world 
of estranged individuals, cut off both from God and from each other. It 
was not until his works from 1911-14, when he began to meditate on the 
writings of Martin Luther and Lev Tolstoi that Shestov rediscovered 
religious faith, and began to articulate religious existentialism proper.  
After publishing a number of articles between 1892 and 1898, 
Shestov wrote his first book, Shakespeare and His Critic Brandes, in 
1896-97. In this work Shestov praised Shakespeare for having found “a 
path in a groundless abyss,” holding to ideals as the only sure ballast in a 
world of chaos. Valevičius argues that in 1897 Shestov still believed in “a 
sort of teleological expediency (tseleobraznost) that governs life ... îand 
thatº there is no such thing as purposeless and meaningless tragedy and 
there can never be.”2 In his very next work on Tolstoi and Nietzsche 
(1897-98), Shestov vehemently rejected idealism of all sorts. From 1897 
until after 1911, God is effectively dead for Shestov. Shestov’s work in 
this period was an attempt to explicate this realization and to come to 
terms with a world without God, while never abandoning the search.  
Shestov’s letters and personal acquaintances between 1897 and 
1911 demonstrate that he continued to act religiously despite his 
philosophical agnosticism, and he explains that “on principle man should 
respect order in the external world and complete chaos in the inner.”3 The 
fact that he worked for a living and was unable to tell his Jewish father for 
seventeen years that he had married a gentile demonstrates that he did not 
always practice the radical faith in the Absurd which he preached. When I 
speak of Shestov’s ‘death of God’ in the pages that follow, therefore, 
                                                           
2 SHESTOV, Shakespeare and His Critic Brandes, (1898); in Andrius VALEVIčUS, 
Lev Shestov and His Times, pp. 10, 18 (New York: Peter Lang, 1993). 
3 For examples of Shestov’s religious activities, see Nathalie BARANOFF-
CHESTOV, Vie de Léon Chestov, trans. Blanche Bronstein-Vinaver, vol. I, 76, 106 
(Paris: Éditions de la Différence, 1991); SHESTOV, All Things are Possible and 
Penultimate Words and Other Essays, trans. S. S. Koteliansky I.ix, p. 11 (Athens: 
Ohio University Press, 1977). 
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what is being discussed is Shestov’s philosophical position in his 
published works, and no attempt is made to ascertain his personal 
spiritual state. 
 
 
I 
 
In 1920, Shestov wrote in his diary that “this year marks the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of when ‘the time fell out of joint,’ or more 
precisely, when an early autumn arrived in the beginning of September.”4 
Exactly what caused this crisis is unclear, but it took Shestov all over 
Europe seeking cures, and probably had personal rather than metaphysical 
issues at its core. Shestov was able to intellectualize this crisis within a 
couple of years, projecting his inner turmoil onto the world at large, and 
finding his own inner biography in the intellectual development of 
numerous thinkers. According to Shestov, many of the thinkers he studied 
had sought their security in morality and Reason, only to suddenly 
discover that ideas could not save. All then violently rejected their 
heritage, asserting irrationality, chaos and groundlessness against a false 
understanding of ‘the good,’ though none were completely successful or 
consistent in their existential stance. One of the first thinkers with whom 
Shestov discovered this affinity was Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). His 
disciple, Benjamin Fondane tells us that when Shestov discovered 
Nietzsche, he “left the house of the wise slamming the door behind him. 
Now he understood that morality, instead of helping us attain freedom 
and truth, was really causing our division amongst ourselves, our 
subjection and our destruction and that by consequence, one must no 
longer try to set time right.”5 Shestov records that when he first read 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals in 1894,  
 
I began reading at eight o’clock in the evening and did not finish until two 
o’clock in the morning. It left me in jitters, devastated, I could not sleep. I 
searched for ways in which I could opposed Nietzsche’s horrible thought, 
cruel thought. ... Of course nature was severe, indifferent ... But thought 
was not nature; there was no reason why it should want to kill the weak, 
drive them to the edge. Why assist nature in its dreadful task? I lost my 
head. ... At the time I knew nothing of Nietzsche, I knew nothing about his 
life. Then one day, I believe it was in the Brokhaus, I read a small 
biography. Nietzsche was one of those people with whom nature had 
                                                           
4 SHESTOV, quoted in BARANOFF-CHESTOV, op. cit., p. 36. 
5 Benjamin FONDANE, “Chestov. Témoin à la charge,” La Conscience malheu-
reuse, quoted in ibid., p. 67. 
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come to terms brutally, relentlessly. Nature found him weak and pushed 
him. On that day I understood.6 
 
Shestov insists that he never prostrated himself before Nietzsche, 
but he did take from him certain very important concepts, the most 
significant being that of the death of God and its partner, ‘beyond good 
and evil.’ As he makes clear in the above quote, Nietzsche was important 
to Shestov not because of his irrationality but rather because his 
philosophical insights are founded in suffering, in an ‘authentic’ 
understanding of existence. Prior to Nietzsche, suffering was considered 
to be negative, unnatural, and something to be overcome. Idealism seeks 
to elevate Truth and Beauty to the extent that “severe, indifferent” nature 
is completely excluded. Forcing obedience to morality, Idealism destroys 
the individual ego and thus “overcomes” the self, denying its autonomy as 
egos are subordinated to a higher truth. Life is denied in order that 
redemption might be believable, and it is also minimized so that the 
suffering inherent in life itself might be minimized, or even abolished. 
Opposing this view, Nietzsche identified suffering with Life herself, and 
for him suffering is deifying and generative, as it is within Greek tragedy: 
“Dionysus cut to pieces is a promise of life: it is eternally reborn and 
comes back from destruction.” The solution of Idealism was impossible, 
Nietzsche argued, because he could not outrun his shadow and erase the 
past sufferings to which he owed his existence — the recognition of a debt 
is itself a cause of suffering.7  
Nietzsche denies sufferers the comfort of knowing that their 
suffering achieves something, rendering it teleologically meaningless. 
The world becomes “a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, 
eternally changing, eternally flooding back ...îaº Dionysian world of 
eternally self-creating, eternally self-destroying ... without goal, unless the 
                                                           
6 SHESTOV, 21 Jan, 1938; in Benjamin FONDANE, ‘Rencontres avec Léon 
Chestov,’ Mercure de France no. 351, 1964, pp. 204-205. 
7 Friedrich NIETZSCHE, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith, II.19, 
III.10 III.17, pp. 69, 94, 109 (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 
1996); Friedrich NIETZSCHE, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, in 
The Portable Nietzsche, Walter Kaufmann, trans. and ed., I.5, I.9, IV.9, pp. 149, 
156, 384 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971); Friedrich NIETZSCHE, “Notes 
(1888),” in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann, 1052, p. 459 
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1971); The Case of Wagner: A Musician’s Problem, 
î1888º, in The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wager, Walter Kaufmann, trans. 
& ed., p. 191 (New York: Vintage Books, 1967); Martin HEIDEGGER, Nietzsche, 
trans. David Farrell Krell, II.8, p. 48 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). 
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joy of the circle is itself a goal.”8 Here suffering is the fundamental 
human lot, and becomes worthwhile because existence itself is of value. 
Rostenne says that “if, at one point, Shestov was able to believe that 
social reforms would one day triumph over human misfortune,” Nietzsche 
“revealed a human misfortune which could not be remedied by any kind 
of social reform that was interested in material poverty and intellectual 
ignorance.”9 
Nietzsche argues that suffering has value once it is incorporated 
into one’s very being, as happened to Zarathustra during his 
convalescence. When “we violate ourselves, ... we are bound to grow 
day-by-day more questionable, worthier of asking questions; perhaps also 
worthier — of living?”10 The procreative value of suffering is why 
Nietzsche can claim to be “infinitely more indebted” to his long illness 
than to his health, because “I owe to it a higher health, one such that it 
grows stronger than everything that it does not destroy. I also owe to it 
my philosophy.”11 The achievement of naïveté is not possible without first 
removing the ‘veil of mŸyŸ’ — an action that itself involves suffering.12 It 
is only through complete hopelessness that one is able to achieve true 
self-consciousness by ceasing to rely on anything or anyone else. Shestov 
was later to equate this action with the receiving of “a new pair of eyes” 
from the Angel of Death. He said, “then one sees strange and new things, 
more than other men see and more than he himself sees with his natural 
eyes,” and argued this view of tragedy against Brandes in his first book, 
Shakespeare and His Critic Brandes.13 In taking this position, Nietzsche 
                                                           
8 NIETZSCHE, Will to Power, p. 1067; quoted in Charles E. SCOTT, The Question of 
Ethics: Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, pp. 27-28 (Bloomington and Indiana-
polis: Indiana University Press, 1990). 
9 Paul ROSTENNE, Léon Chestov, 1967; quoted in VALEVIčUS, op. cit., p. 75. 
10 NIETZSCHE, Genealogy; quoted in Tyler T. ROBERTS, “‘This Art of 
Transfiguration Is Philosophy’: Nietzsche’s Asceticism,” Journal of Religion 76 
(1996), no. 3, p. 421. 
11 NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, Preface to the Second Edition, 3; quoted in 
SHESTOV, “Tolstoy and Nietzsche,” Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, trans. 
Bernard Martin, p. 78 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1969). 
12 Naïveté is a Schillerian term used to describe “the oneness of man with nature.” 
The ‘veil of mŸyŸ’ is Schopenhauer’s term for the perception of reality that 
“separated individuals and cognized the unity of the metaphysical will.” 
NIETZSCHE, The Birth of Tragedy, in The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of 
Wagner, Walter Kaufmann, trans. and ed., p. 43 (New York: Vintage Books, 
1967); David E. CARTWRIGHT, “The Last Temptation of Zarathustra,” Journal of 
the History of Philosophy 31 (1993), no. 1, p. 55. 
13 SHESTOV, “The Conquest of Self-Evidences: Dostoievsky’s Philosophy,” In 
Job’s Balances: On the Sources of Eternal Truths, trans. Camilla Coventry and C. 
A. Macartney, p. 5 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975); Bernice Glatzer 
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is opposing himself completely to modernity, as he purchases pleasure 
and knowledge at the price of suffering — a transaction that was the 
complete antithesis of everything that his mentor, Schopenhauer, taught.14  
Against modernity’s linear view of history and progress 
Nietzsche opposes “eternal return”. This is the thought that “you will 
have to live this life ... once again and countless times more; and there 
will be nothing new to it, but every pain and every pleasure, every 
thought and sigh, and everything unutterably petty or grand in your life 
will have to come back to you, all in the same sequence and order.”15 As 
Lampert notes, “to affirm eternal return is to construe both time and being 
in ways inimical to modernity’s understanding of them and to overcome 
its revenge against time and being.”16 It explodes not only modernity, but 
metaphysics itself, forcing one back into the chaotic world of the pre-
Socratics, in particular that of Heraclitus, where “the ordering, the same 
for all, no god nor man has made, but it ever was and is and will be: fire 
everliving, kindled in measures and in measures going out,” and where 
“the beginning and end are shared in the circumference of a circle.”17 
This explosion of Idealism is what Nietzsche means by the 
‘death of God’, which he proclaimed loudly and violently. Modernity had 
replaced the Biblical God with Reason, and now Nietzsche claims that 
this new, rational deity is also dead. Shestov explains that “the ‘good,’ 
‘fraternal love’ — the experience of Nietzsche has taught us — is not God. 
... Nietzsche has shown us the way. We must seek that which is higher 
than compassion, higher than the ‘good’; we must seek God.”18 The 
conclusion that Shestov does not draw from this — a conclusion 
foundational for Nietzsche’s ethics — is that in a world “beyond good and 
evil” the strong, having endured suffering and conquered, have the right 
                                                                                                                        
ROSENTHAL, “Shestov, Lev,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward 
CRAIG ed., vol. VIII, p. 742 (London and New York: Routledge, 1998). 
14 SHESTOV, “Dostoevksy and Nietzsche” Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, p. 
315. 
15 NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann, IV, 341, p. 101 (London: Chatto & Windus, 1971). 
16 Laurence LAMPERT, Nietzsche’s Teaching: An Interpretation of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, p. 276 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1986). 
17 NIETZSCHE, Zarathustra, III.2.ii, pp. 270-271; Heraclitus, “Fragment XXXVII,” 
and “Fragment XCIX,” in Charles H. KAHN, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: 
An edition of the fragments with translation and commentary, pp. 45, 75 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
18 SHESTOV, “Tolstoy and Nietzsche,” Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, p. 140. 
His italics. 
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to ignore the weak and to trample them underfoot.19 Shestov claims that 
the ideal of the Übermensch was foreign to Nietzsche’s true character as 
well.20 As Gal’tseva notes, Shestov’s “hero was not the master and creator 
but the ‘drowning man,’ the ‘living dead,’ who had been abandoned and 
forgotten by idealist philosophers,”21 but Shestov criticized pity without 
effective action, crying “woe to him who has nothing to offer but 
compassion.”22 God was no longer compassion or ‘the good’, and 
consequently He had been completely lost.  
The God that Shestov is left with is almost that described by Paul 
Tillich in his discussion of ‘absolute faith’: “Theism in all its forms is 
transcended in the experience we have called absolute faith. It is the 
accepting of the acceptance without somebody or something that accepts. 
... It transcends both mysticism and personal encounter.”23 Like Tillich, 
Shestov writes that “the ultimate truths are absolutely unintelligible,” but 
then qualifies it by saying, “unintelligible ...but not inaccessible.”24 Prior 
to 1911 Shestov believed, with Nietzsche, that truth could be accessed by 
extraordinary individuals through tragedy, by those who did not suffer 
from giddiness when ascending the alpine summits.25 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
19 NIETZSCHE, Zarathustra, I.22, p. 187; Genealogy of Morals, III.14, pp. 101-103; 
Twilight of the Idols or, How one philosophizes with a hammer, in The Portable 
Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann, IX.20, p. 526 (London: Chatto & Windus, 
1971). 
20 SHESTOV, “Tolstoy and Nietzsche,” Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Nietzsche, p. 120. 
21 Zakydalsky, paraphrase of Renata GAL’TSEVA, Ocherki russkoi utopicheskoi 
mysli XX veka, 1992; in Taras D. ZAKYDALSKY, “Lev Shestov and the Revival of 
Religious Thought in Russia,” in Russian Thought After Communism: The 
Recovery of a Philosophical Heritage, James P. SCANLAN ed., p. 159 (London: M. 
E. Sharpe, 1994. 
22 SHESTOV, Shakespeare and His Critic Brandes, 1896-97; quoted in Sidney 
MONAS, “Introduction,” in SHESTOV, Chekhov and Other Essays, trans. Sidney 
Monas, p. xvii (Michigan: Ann Arbor, 1966). 
23 Paul TILLICH, The Courage to Be, pp. 185-6 (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1952). Note that while Shestov affirms this aspect of Tillich’s 
understanding of God, Tillich’s other ideas about ‘nonbeing’, ‘estrangement’ and 
‘anxiety’ are not part of Shestov’s mental world. 
24 Lev SHESTOV, All Things are Possible; quoted in José R. MAIA NETO, The 
Christianization of Pyrrhonism: Scepticism and Faith in Pascal, Kierkegaard, 
and Shestov, p. 93 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). 
25 Lev SHESTOV, All Things are Possible, II.xl, p. 112. 
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II 
 
While the majority of society remained subservient to Idealism, 
the extremely heterogeneous artistic and literary movement known today 
as ‘Modernism’ can be seen as a revolt against this apathy in the face of 
the death of God, and an attempt to revision the world in light of this fact, 
and for this reason Shestov’s agenda is synonymous with that of 
Modernism. Modernism sought to replace their own culture’s logic, 
which had relied upon the concept of a rational God, with their own logic, 
which had its origin in the loss God. The nineteenth century had tolerated 
God’s death because the Romantics still felt Him in the natural world, but 
rapidly increasing urbanization denied their children these natural 
hierophanies. Cityscapes and interior scenes dominated the work of such 
artists as Mariia Bashkirtseva even in the 1880s, crowding out the natural 
landscapes of Romantic art. Nature in the work of the poet Marina 
Tsetaeva is ‘anti-Edenic’ — a place of toil and sin rather than beatitude.26 
The morality enshrined in traditional jurisprudence, too, had been 
replaced by humanistic and utilitarian theories promoting “the greatest 
good for the greatest number,” no longer relying upon ‘groundless’ moral 
imperatives. As Ivan Karamazov put it: “If there is no God, everything is 
permissible.”27  
For the Modernists the loss of God, who in modernity had 
provided the lynchpin by which true and rational knowledge was 
possible,28 was a truly momentous event. They were desperately trying to 
revision a cosmos that had lost its centre. As E. M. Forster wrote, “things 
won’t fit.”29 A close friend of Shestov said that “for some reason there is 
something broken within him.”30 The Modernists’ chaos placed them at 
odds with their societies at large, which, despite widespread agnosticism 
in practice if not profession, stubbornly persisted in living as though the 
world had not fundamentally changed. Mythological meta-narratives such 
as the idea of progress still dominated historical and scientific discourses, 
                                                           
26 Pamela CHESTER, “Painted mirrors: landscape and self-representation in 
Russian women’s verbal and visual art,” in Russian Literature, Modernism and 
the Visual Arts, Catriona KELLY and Stephen LOVELL eds., pp. 286-293 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
27 Ivan Karamazov, in Feodor DOSTOEVSKII, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. 
Constance Garnett, vol. 1, II.vi, pp. 65-66 (London: Heron Books, 1967). 
28 René DESCARTES, “Discourse on the Method of Properly Conducting One’s 
Reason and of Seeking the Truth in the Sciences,” in Discourse on Method and 
the Meditations, trans. F. E. Stucliffe, IV, p. 58 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: 
Penguin Books, 1979). 
29 E. M. FORSTER, A Room With A View, p. 39 (Bath: Penguin Books, 1995). 
30 Evgeniya Guertsyg, quoted in VALEVIČUS, op. cit., p. 69. 
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morality was still considered ‘right’, and people still felt a sense of 
belonging, not only to their imagined communities, but also to their 
allotted position within the medieval Chain of Being. Modernist 
philosophers, writers and artists therefore went to extremes to convey that 
the times were out of joint, not only in their art, but also in their 
outrageous lifestyles. Characters as varied as Dali and Mayakovskii 
created public spectacles simply to distance themselves from stifling 
convention.  
In Modernist representation, “all boundaries fade away and the 
world reveals itself for the mad slaughterhouse that it is.”31 Grammar was 
tied to God, and with His death existing forms of communication become 
unsatisfactory, anachronisms from a bygone era that must be abandoned 
as the Modernists searched for new interpretive and expressive models.32 
Shestov claimed that “our thought becomes false when we clothe it in 
words not so much because we do not find adequate expression for it but, 
above all, because we do not dare show it to others in the form under 
which it was originally revealed to us,”33 and rather than calling for the 
destruction of language or the imposition of new forms of representation, 
as other Modernists did, he simply asked for truthfulness in 
communication. According to the Modernists, chaos characterizes social 
relations, production and commerce, religious establishments, and is 
reflected most of all in music and art. From the scattered and 
unpredictable crescendos of Stravinsky’s Le Sacré du Printemps, to the 
disjointed word patterns of Dada or Futurism, chaos dominates, 
encroaching upon the freedom of the artist and their ability to represent 
reality.  
Loss of religious faith and the quest of the individual to find new 
discourses to replace those of idealism comprise the dominant themes of 
James Joyce’s 1916 masterpiece, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. 
At this time European society was dominated by humanism and a belief 
in progress. Europeans exercised unprecedented levels of control over 
their environment and over other cultures both collectively and 
individually. Kolb describes the ‘modern individual’ as “a perceiving, 
choosing being potentially free to maximize whatever is desired.”34 No 
longer bound by any necessary religious or ethical laws, Stephen Dedalus, 
                                                           
31 Henry MILLER, Tropic of Cancer, p. 177 (London: Flamingo, 1993). 
32 NIETZSCHE, Twilight, III.5, p. 483; Douwe FOKKEMA & Elrud IBSCH, Modernist 
Conjectures: A Mainstream in European Literature 1910-1940, pp. 13-14 
(London: C Hurst, 1987). 
33 Lev SHESTOV, “Thoughts Expressed and Not Expressed,” Potestas Clavium, 
trans. Bernard Martin, p. 92 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1968). 
34 David KOLB, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger, and After, p. 6 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986). 
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Joyce’s hero, makes his own way in the world without submitting to any 
body or doctrine. In this — though perhaps in little else — Dedalus greatly 
resembles Dostoevskii’s Underground Man, who preaches ‘whim’, and 
demands “the right to use it whenever I want to,” revolting against 
traditional behavioral mores despite being tempted by their capacity to 
yield power. Neither of these heroes is comfortable in their freedom, 
however, the Underground Man admitting that he has “lost the habit of 
living.”35 Later, Henry Miller declared that in his freedom he was 
“inhuman,” having “nothing to do with the creaking machinery of 
humanity.”36 Both Dedalus and the Underground Man therefore seek 
religious transcendence to redeem them from their lot,37 but as God is 
dead, He cannot rescue them from their alienation.  
Other Modernist heroes such as J.-K. Huysmans’ Durtal search 
for the lost supernatural elsewhere, but after committing sacrilege, Durtal 
emerges from his Black Mass disgusted and furious both with himself and 
with his lover.38 While isolated individuals, such as T. S. Eliot, emerge 
from the chaos into religious belief, adogmatism remains the trademark of 
the Modernist movement, any absolutes being regarded with deep 
mistrust.39 Shestov reacted violently against Berdiaev’s suggestion that he 
was therefore a skeptic, because, he says, “skeptics are those who are 
persuaded that there is nothing to be searched for given that nothing will 
ever be found. ... îI am not favourable toº skepticism but to a flexible 
adogmatic dogmatism.”40 In this he was akin to many Modernists who, to 
                                                           
35 Underground Man, in Feodor DOSTOEVSKII, Notes from Underground, in 
DOSTOEVSKII, Dostoyevsky, trans. Andrew R. MacAndrew, I.x, II.x, pp. 118, 199 
(New York: New American Library, New York, 1961). 
36 MILLER, Cancer, p. 247. 
37 James JOYCE, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, p. 165 (Hertfordshire: 
Wordsworth Classics, 1992). The original manuscript of Notes from Underground 
concluded “from all this the need for faith and Christ,” though this was edited out 
by the censors (Fyodor Dostoevskii, letter to Mikhail Dostoevskii, March 26, 
1864; quoted in Robert Louis JACKSON, Dostoevsky’s Underground Man in 
Russian Literature, pp. 27-28 (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1958). The proffered 
and lost salvation is still visible in the extant work in Liza’s offer of communion 
to the hero in II.x, p. 199, for Dostoevskii’s salvation is essentially found in 
sobornost’. On this question, see Marina KOSTALEVSKY, Dostoevsky and 
Soloviev: The Art of Integral Vision, p. 32 (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1997). 
38 Joris-Karl HUYSMANS, The Damned (Là-Bas), trans. Terry Hale, p. 230 
(London: Penguin Books, 2001). 
39 FOKKEMA & IBSCH, op. cit., 4; Michael HOLLINGTON, “Svevo, Joyce and 
Modernist Time,” in Modernism 1890-1930, M. BRADBURY and J. MCFARLANE 
eds., p. 432 (London: Penguin Books, 1991). 
40 SHESTOV, Les commencements et les fins, quoted in MAIA NETO, op. cit., p. 95. 
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use Heller’s metaphor, keep a chair vacant for the Messiah, not knowing 
if he will ever come and rejecting any would-be occupant as a pretender.41 
Losing the naturalistic utopia reflected in eighteenth century 
architecture, the late nineteenth century “was left with the utopia of form 
as a way of recovering the human totality through an ideal synthesis, as a 
way of embracing disorder through order.”42 As Berdiaev argued, “human 
powers that escape from a state of organism inevitably become enslaved 
to mechanization,” and union with machines separates people from 
communion with each other.43 Humans were boxed into their environment 
and had to find life within themselves rather than looking upward for 
salvation, searching for what Clark calls “a kind of profane 
illumination.”44 In Belyi’s St Petersburg the city envelops the characters, 
who appear and disappear out of the fog at random, trapped within its 
dark, narrow streets and its civic traditions of rebellion and patricide.45 
The ‘modern’ novelist, Tolstoi, “was most thoroughly at home in a city 
when it was being burnt down,”46 but for the Modernists the city is their 
natural environment.  
In the Modernist novel, in a rapidly changing technological 
world, characters no longer remain static, but become themselves 
“provisional and corrigible hypotheses” — poor soil to ground salvation in, 
though this unstable self remains the sole point of reference for the 
individual.47 Unlike the religious paradises promised by other religious 
philosophers, Shestov’s salvation is this-worldly, and he repeatedly 
emphasizes its impossible nature. Despite Kierkegaard’s fideistic 
philosophy, Shestov notes that “he cannot make the ‘movement of faith,’ 
cannot stir even a limb; it is as if he were bewitched and his will 
paralyzed, or, as he himself said, in a swoon.” In his later thought, it is 
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precisely this impossibility that makes existentialism the best philosophy, 
because “miracles alone can save man.”48 
The modern city is the product of social planning and ‘scientific’ 
thought, architects becoming hegemons of the modern city’s aesthetics. A 
characteristic of the modern age is the reduction of knowledge to 
technical understanding, with the desacralisation of nature as its necessary 
corollary.49 Technical thought is always cognitive rather than emotional, 
and the highly educated Modernists always privileged the head over the 
heart. Shestov bemoans that fact that in the ‘savages,’ Herbert Spencer  
 
sees a barbarity, as an educated European should. I also see in them 
barbarity, because I also am a European and have a scientific education. 
But I deeply envy their barbarity, and curse the cultivation which has 
herded me together with believing missionaries, idealist, materialist, and 
positivist philosophers, into the narrow fold of the sultry and disgusting 
world. We may write books to prove the immortality of the soul, but our 
wives won’t follow us into the other world....50  
 
Reason could no longer satisfy, and disturbs rather than comforts 
the modern thinker, who must nonetheless continue thinking in order to 
remain ‘authentic’. Chekhov’s Nikitin “felt as though his head were 
immense and empty as a barn, and that new, peculiar thoughts were 
wandering about in it like tall shadows.”51 Belyi links a loss of rational 
laws and absolute truths to “primordial darkness,” in which his hero is 
lost.52 Reason is forever critical, never able to rest on any certain truths, 
and uncertain even of its own legitimacy, as rational inquiry requires 
freedom, and “freedom grounds nothing.”53  
Mental illness is thus a recurrent theme of modernity, indeed, 
modernity can only be properly revealed through madness, for rationality 
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requires consistency, and consistency is not freedom.54 Kovrin, in 
Chekhov’s ‘Black Monk’, is driven insane by his own genius, and 
Nietzsche, Weber, Shestov and Nijinsky all suffer nervous breakdowns. 
Many of Belyi’s characters suffer “brain fatigue and pseud-
hallucinations.” As Berman observes, “the freedom it îmodernityº confers 
is the freedom of a beautifully formed, perfectly sealed tomb.”55 This is 
also the period that witnessed the rise of the psycho-analysis of neurosis. 
As noted earlier, the idea of progress dominated modern society, 
though that progress now relied, not on God, but on humans alone. 
Essentially a secularization of the old Christian view of history, modern 
thinkers saw the present as a transitory stage in a process of either linear 
or dialectical development, but always with the past subordinated to the 
future, and with the telos being of supreme importance.56 The chaos and 
destruction of World War One also rendered the idea of progress less 
credible, Modernist writers rejecting linear understandings of time, 
experimenting with cyclical models, fragmentary time, or with the 
reassertion of barbarism.57 Once again, as the world around them 
crumbles, individuals become the only centre, and Modernism becomes 
“the quest for the pure, self-referential art object.”58 
Individualism was not an established fact at the turn of the 
twentieth century, however, and was something that many Modernists had 
to fight for, asserting the will of the individual against the mediocrity of 
the ‘herd’. Balmont writes that “I hate mankind, I flee from it in haste. 
My one home is my deserted soul.”59 Shestov felt exactly the same way. 
He writes that “since, sooner or later, every individual is doomed to 
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irremediable unhappiness, the last word of philosophy is loneliness.”60 
Therefore Modernism became a very elitist movement, and one that saw 
itself as radically different from surrounding society. André Gide wrote 
that being “in disagreement with one’s times — that is what justifies being 
an artist.”61 God was dead, but in society, 
 
The works proceed until run down; although 
Bereft of purpose, void of use, still go.62 
 
The shock tactics and radical nature of many Modernist works 
can be seen as a desperate attempt to alert the masses to the nihilism that 
was engulfing their lives. Creative activity had lost its meaning and had 
become simple commercialization — art was reduced to a saleable 
commodity. Mainstream society was bankrupt and devoid of value in 
their eyes, so the Modernists searched for meaning in the extraordinary 
rather than the average, in the improbable rather than the likely, and 
looked for dissonance rather than melody in art and life, though they 
might yearn for naïve normality.63 Viktor Shklovskii’s distinction 
between ‘seeing’ and ‘recognizing’ is helpful here, as not only the 
Formalists, but all Modernists strove to help people to ‘see’ objects that 
they would otherwise glance over. Schklovskii hoped to achieve his goal 
by the “making strange” or the “defamiliarization” of mundane objects, 
forcing the reappraisal of the everyday in light of the new, modern reality 
that God was dead.64 
 
 
III 
Shestov’s mental world was almost identical to that of European 
Modernism, but did he see himself and did others see him as a Modernist? 
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Kuvakin argues that “they considered him to be one of ‘theirs’ in God-
seeking and decadent circles” in Russia itself, though she expresses 
reservations about whether Shestov really ‘fitted in’ to these circles.65 
Although Shestov maintained close friendships with Berdiaev, Bulgakov, 
Remizov, Belyi and Rozanov, and frequented Ivanov’s ‘Tower’,66 he did 
not find kindred spirits amongst either the Russian religious philosophers 
or the Russian Symbolists,67 as both dealt with metaphysical conceptions 
that Shestov could not accept, but this does not rule out the possibility 
that Shestov had commonalities with the non-religious Modernists both in 
Russia and abroad. When Symbolism and Modernism are viewed in light 
of their religious leanings, it becomes clear that Blok was correct in 
seeing Symbolism as the opposite of “the poison of Modernism,” — not as 
its ally.68 
The poet Minski, at least, saw clear resemblances between 
Shestov and the Modernist trend in the arts: “These days, when painters 
reject pattern and perspective, composers, melody and harmony, poets, 
measure and rhyme, why not have a philosopher deny reason?”69 In 1901 
Serge Diaghilev sought Shestov as an editor for Mir Isskusstva (The 
World of Art) a journal he had founded two years earlier — a post that 
Shestov did not take up, though several of his reviews were published 
here — and Diaghilev assisted Shestov in his research on Chekhov.70 Ergé 
records that “amongst us, at school îin 1906º, he had a circle who made a 
true cult of that writer.”71 Shestov clearly appealed far more to the 
younger generation than to the writers of the Silver Age, many of whom 
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found him confusing and irrelevant, Filozofov and Merezkhovskii making 
a public declaration in 1909 that Shestov was poisoning the Russian youth 
and was extremely dangerous, labeling him a wolf in sheep’s clothing.72 
Viacheslav Ivanov wrote to Shestov that “if it’s not possible to build 
culture with you, it’s not possible to build it without you, without your 
voice which puts on guard death and spiritual glory. You resemble a 
raven with the water of death and life.”73  
Whether or not Shestov agreed with the dominant artistic trends, 
he always contributed to the Modernist journals.74 He also continued to 
meet with Russian writers after the war, indulging in long philosophical 
discussions with Lundberg, Ehrenberg and Belyi in Berlin during the 
early 1920s. In Paris, Shestov published in the Nouvelle Revue Française 
and Mercure de France, and both André Gide and Charles Du Bos spoke 
very highly of him. Together with Paul Desjardin they invited Shestov to 
Potigny in August 1923, where he associated with A. M. Schmidt, Jean 
Tardieu and Roger Martin du Gard amongst others.75  
D. H. Lawrence also felt an affinity with Shestov, writing a 
forward to the 1920 English edition of All Things are Possible. Lawrence 
wrote that Shestov’s book “is not nihilism. It is the shaking free of the 
human psyche of the old bonds. The positive central cry idea is that the 
human psyche, or soul, really believes in itself, and in nothing else.”76 
This may not be true to Shestov’s later work but it is possibly the most 
penetrating contemporary assessment of Shestov’s anthropology at the 
time that All Things are Possible was written. Learning from Nietzsche 
that God was dead, and that therefore there could be no idea of progress, 
no meaning in suffering, and no reference outside of the self, between 
1897 and 1911 Shestov sought to understand how live as an individual — 
as an egoist. This stance brought him into contact, both intellectually and 
personally, with many of the leading figures of European Modernism 
because his pessimistic worldview found so many similarities with their 
own. 
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